MOL Prestige Firefighting Generic
0 (0 Likes / 0 Dislikes)
[MOL Prestige
Fire in the Engine Room]
The following incident is an account
of a real-life emergency
that took place aboard the MOL
Prestige on January 31st, 2018
In this video, we will recall the
timeline of the MOL Prestige fire
and showcase moment by
moment what occurred.
We will also identify the
causes and factors
that contributed to the emergency.
Exploring both what
could have been done
beforehand to prevent the incident,
as well as what should
have been done
while the incident
was occurring.
As you watch this video,
ask yourself,
Could this happen on my ship?
The MOL Prestige, a container ship
headed to Tokyo
from Vancouver,
British Columbia
is on it's fourth voyage into
the US emission control area,
within which low sulfur
marine gas oil is used
for the main and
auxiliary engines.
The ship departed from
Vancouver on January 30th
with an estimated time to exit
the emission control area
on the 31st.
In preparation for the vessel's exit
from the emission control area,
the Chief Engineer instructs
the Fourth Engineer
to start the purifier for
the heavy fuel oil, or HFO.
After confirming with
the Second Engineer,
the Fourth Engineer begins
the HFO purification
taking suction from
the HFO settling tank.
Within 10 minutes, the purifier's
inlet's alarm was triggered
at 120 degrees Celcius.
After informing the
Second Engineer,
the Fourth Engineer starts the HFO
transfer pump on manual mode
aiming to reduce the temperature
of the settling tank with cold oil
from the 7S HFO
storage tank.
Returning to the
purifier platform,
the Fourth Engineer
suddenly observes
fumes and smoke being emitted
from the purifier hoppers.
Immediately he stops
the transfer pump.
Something is wrong.
Meanwhile, the second engineer,
upon being informed of the HFO
inlet high temperature alarm,
observes smoke and fumes
being emitted from the
sludge discharge ports
of number 1 purifier.
He instructs the Fourth Engineer
to stop the purifier
and shut the sludge
discharge valve.
By this time, fumes are
pouring out
from all HFO purifiers and
pump casing drains.
The Motor man, working at
the boiler platform
observes thick black smoke
and the Junior Engineer near
the number 3 generator
begins seeing rising flames.
A catastrophe is in motion.
In a confused panic, the crew
retreats to the engine control room.
They call the chief engineer.
Believing it to be
a false alarm,
the Chief Engineer rushes down
to the engine control room.
The fire alarm is triggered.
Thick black smoke is now filling
the engine control room,
where the 6 crew members
are now trapped.
Within minutes, the
quick closing valve
is activated from
the fire station,
tripping all generators.
The emergency generator
comes on load.
Trapped inside the burning
engine control room,
are the 6 crew members.
The Chief Engineer,
the Second Engineer,
the Fourth Engineer,
the Junior Engineer,
and Motor man,
1 and 2.
Below the second deck,
oil is overflowing
from the settling tank.
Burning around the tank and
the number 3 generator,
on the bottom platform.
Crews are mustered
at their fire stations.
Attached to a life line,
the Chief Officer
makes his way into the
engine control room
with a breathing apparatus.
He carries with him two
portable escape sets.
As he looks down,
he realizes
he is stepping through
puddles of heavy fuel oil.
The temperature is rapidly climbing
above 70 degree Celsius,
and there is now zero visibility
in the engine room.
Using the escape set located
in the engine control room,
and the sets he was carrying,
he guides the Chief Engineer,
Second and Fourth Engineers,
out of the engine room,
amid oil puddles,
high temperatures,
and zero visibility.
Upon attempting to return to rescue
the remaining three men,
the Chief officer is unable
to make it inside.
As the temperatures inside the
engine room are now too high,
black smoke begins entering into
the engine control room.
Panic escalates among the
remaining three men
as they realize the
terrible truth.
A rescue attempt may
no longer be possible.
Clinging desperately
to their VHF radio,
and hoping against hope,
the men overhear
transmissions
about the possible release of
CO2 to contain the fire.
With the temperatures rising and
the fire raging out of control,
The Master weighs the decision
under crushing stress.
In consultation with the emergency
response team ashore,
The decision to release
CO2 is delayed
in order to exhaust all
rescue attempts.
Time is running out
for the trapped men.
It's now or never.
As a last resort, the emergency
response team suggests
the men try to use an adjacent
elevator to escape.
Miraculously, the elevator is
found to be operational
on the emergency
generator circuit.
The last ditch effort
goes underway,
as the elevator is sent down to
the engine control room level.
Choking through
the dark smoke
and extremely
high temperature,
the men blindly crawl a five foot
path towards the elevator
in complete darkness.
The three men collapse
into the elevator
as it descends out of
the inferno to safety.
The rescue being successful,
CO2 is finally released
into the engine room.
Three crew members
suffered injuries
and the engine room suffered fire,
soot, and water damages.
The ship lost power
and propulsion
and had to be towed
back to Seattle.
In total, the cost of
repairs and cleaning
plus cargo claims amounted
to over 5.5 million USD.
For the surviving crew
members though,
the cost could have
been much higher.
So how did this fire occur?
Following the investigation,
it was discovered that there
were 4 key elements
that contributed to
the devastating fire.
The first element was
the tank's float gauges.
The settling and service HFO tanks
are fitted with float gauges
that indicate the
oil level in the tank
and provide the high
and low level alarms.
These gauges however,
had not been functioning
since the vessel was taken into
management in January 2017.
Ship staff had failed to report this
defect on the PMS PAL
and kept the superintendents
unaware of their condition.
The Chief Engineer had attempted
to repair the gauges,
for which he had opened a flange
on top of the settling tank
and left this flange open.
Without an indication of
oil level in the tank,
and with an open flange
on the tank,
the settling tank overfilled
and spilled oil through the open
flange into the engine room.
Had all defects been identified
in a timely manner,
the catastrophic overflow
could have been prevented.
The second element
to the fire concerned
the excessive fuel leaks
from the main engine
whilst operating on LSMGO
within the ECA.
These leaks were estimated to
displace nearly 1500 L a day.
These leaks were collected
in the drain tank
and then pumped to
the HFO settling tank,
creating a layer of LSMGO
floating on top of HFO
in the settling tank.
The resulting overflow mixture
was extremely flammable
with a flashpoint below
60 degree Celsius.
Had the LSMGO leaks
been reduced,
or had the LSMGO not been
transferred to the settling tank,
this disaster may
have been avoided.
The third element
to the fire,
was that the settling tank
heating coil valves
were not holding,
which steadily rose the temperature
inside the oil tank.
Eventually, the mixture
of LSMGO
and HFO inside the
settling tank
rose to 120
degrees Celsius
which created a flammable
atmosphere.
Flammable LSMGO, then
overflowed the settling tank
and easily found a
source of ignition
within the engine room.
had the settling tank temperature
not been allowed to rise
by repairing or blanking
the steam coil inlet valves,
the fire may have
been prevented.
The final element to the fire,
was the HFO transfer pump
being started on
manual mode
to transfer oil from 7S,
the settling tank.
This decision was made
on the assumption
the fuel oil transfer pump
would cut out
when the upper auto stop switch
was activated inside the settling tank.
However, inspection of
the circuit diagram
confirmed this was
not the case.
The settling tank was
already nearly full,
when the transfer
pump was started
and soon overflowed into
both the overflow tank
and through an open flange
on top of the tank.
Had the transfer pump been not
used on manual mode,
the overflow may not
have taken place.
However, these elements
were not prevented
and a catastrophic
blaze resulted.
Escalating matters
further,
the crew did not
react properly.
At the onset of the emergency,
the engine crew failed
to follow procedures in
evacuating the engine room.
The Chief Engineer, instead of
immediately going to his
Master station on
the upper deck,
went down to the
engine control room
because he believed it
to be a false alarm.
Additionally, the Master did not
order the immediate evacuation
of the engine room
which finally led to
six crew members
being trapped in the
engine control room.
The Chief officer
wore an SCVA
set to assist in the evacuation
of the crew from the ECR,
but he did not wear
a fire man outfit,
resulting in the Chief Officer
sustaining severe burns
during the rescue operation.
While three crew members
were rescued,
with three others
in the ECR,
fire extinguishing CO2
could not be released,
as this would endanger the lives
of these three crew members.
Had each of the individuals
followed their proper protocol,
CO2 could have been
released promptly,
which would have quickly and
effectively extinguished the fire,
preventing excessive damage.
The use of fire hoses to
cool down the engine room
during the rescue operation
would not have been necessary,
preventing water damage to
machinery and electrical circuits.
As we have seen,
the MOL Prestige fire
was the result of
several factors.
If any of them had been prevented,
the fire may not have occured.
These circumstances are not
isolated to the MOL Prestige,
and could happen on any ship.
They underly the importance of
complying with procedures,
reporting all defects
using PMS PAL,
timely repairs of equipment,
and diligent and
detailed inspections.
Emergency response procedures
are provided
and must be strictly complied with
at all times.
You and the lives of
your crew depend on it.