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Transcript for The Crisis of Credit
| Time | Content |
|---|---|
| 00:03 → 00:07 |
the crisis of credit visualized |
| 00:09 → 00:11 |
what is the credit crisis? |
| 00:11 → 00:13 |
It is a worldwide financial fiasco |
| 00:13 → 00:16 |
involvig terms you probably heard like |
| 00:16 → 00:17 |
Sub-prime mortgages |
| 00:17 → 00:19 |
collateralized debt obligations |
| 00:19 → 00:21 |
frozen credit markets |
| 00:21 → 00:23 |
and credit default swaps |
| 00:23 → 00:25 |
Who is affected? |
| 00:25 → 00:26 |
Everyone. |
| 00:26 → 00:28 |
How then happen. |
| 00:28 → 00:29 |
Here's How. |
| 00:29 → 00:32 |
The crisis of credit brings two groups of people together |
| 00:32 → 00:34 |
Home owners and investors |
| 00:34 → 00:37 |
Home owners represent their mortages |
| 00:37 → 00:40 |
and investors represent their money |
| 00:40 → 00:42 |
These mortages represent houses |
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and these money represent large institutions |
| 00:45 → 00:47 |
like pension funds, insurance companies |
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sovereign funds, mutual funds etc. |
| 00:50 → 00:53 |
These groups are braught together to the financial system |
| 00:53 → 00:56 |
a bunch of banks and brokers commonly known as |
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wall street |
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Although it might not seem like it |
| 00:59 → 01:02 |
these banks at wall street are closely connected to these |
| 01:02 → 01:04 |
houses at main street. |
| 01:04 → 01:07 |
To understand how le't's start from the beginning |
| 01:07 → 01:12 |
Years ago the inverstors were sitting on their pile of money |
| 01:12 → 01:14 |
looking for a good investment to turn it into |
| 01:14 → 01:16 |
more money |
| 01:16 → 01:18 |
Traditionally they go to the US Federal Reserve |
| 01:18 → 01:20 |
where they buy treasury bills |
| 01:20 → 01:22 |
believed to be the safest investment |
| 01:22 → 01:23 |
but |
| 01:23 → 01:26 |
In the wake of the dot com bust and 11 september |
| 01:26 → 01:29 |
Federal reserve chairman Alan Greenspan |
| 01:29 → 01:34 |
lowers interests rates to 1% to keep the economy strong |
| 01:34 → 01:38 |
One percent is a very low return on investment, so the investors said |
| 01:38 → 01:40 |
no thanks |
| 01:40 → 01:44 |
On the flip side this means banks on wall street can borrow |
| 01:44 → 01:46 |
from the Fed for only 1% |
| 01:46 → 01:49 |
add to that general surpluses from |
| 01:49 → 01:51 |
Japan, China and Middle East |
| 01:51 → 01:54 |
and there is an abundance of cheap credit |
| 01:54 → 01:57 |
This makes borrowing money easy for banks |
| 01:57 → 02:00 |
and causes them to go crazy with |
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LEVERAGE |
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LEVERAGE is borrowing money to amplify the outcome of a deal |
| 02:06 → 02:09 |
Here is how it works: |
| 02:09 → 02:12 |
Ina normal deal someone with 10 thousand dollars |
| 02:12 → 02:15 |
buys a box for 10 000 dollars |
| 02:16 → 02:21 |
he then sells it to someone else for 11 000 dollars |
| 02:22 → 02:25 |
for a 1 000 dollars profit, a good deal |
| 02:26 → 02:29 |
but using leverage, someone with 10 000 dollars |
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would go borrow 990 000 more dollars |
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getting him one million dollars in hand |
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then he goes and buys 100 boxes |
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with his one million dollars |
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and sells them to someone else for 1 100 000 dollars |
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then he pays back his 990 000 plus 10 000 in interest |
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and after his initial 10 000, he is left with 90 000 dollar profit |
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versus the other guys 1 000 |
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levrage turns good deals into great deals |
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this is a major way banks make their money |
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so Wall st. takes out a ton of credit |
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makes grate deals and grows tremendously rich |
| 03:26 → 03:27 |
and then pays it back |
| 03:29 → 03:32 |
the investors see this and want a piece of the action |
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and this gives Wall st. an idea |
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they can connect the investors to the home owners |
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through morgages |
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here is how it works |
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a family wants a house |
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so they save for a down payment |
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and contact a morgage broker |
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morgage broker connects the family to a lender |
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who gives them a morgage |
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the broker makes a nice comission |
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the family buys a house and becomes home owners |
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this is great for them because housing prices |
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have been rising practicaly forever |
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everything works out nicely |
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one day, the lender gets a call from an investment banker |
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who wants to buy the morgage |
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the lender sells it to him for a very nice fee |
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the investment banker then borrows millions of dollars |
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and buys thousands more morgages |
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and puts them into a nice little box |
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this means that every month |
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he gets the payments from the home owners of all the morgages in the box |
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then he (seeks?) his banker wizzards on it |
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to work their financial magic |
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which is basically cutting it into three slices |
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safe, okay and risky |
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they pack the slices back up in the box |
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and call it a Collateralized Debt Obligation |
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or, CDO |
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a CDO works laike three cascading trays |
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as money comes in, the top tray fills first |
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then spils over into the middle |
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and whatever is left into the bottom |
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the money comes from home owners paying off their morgages |
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if some owners don't pay and default on their morgage |
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less money comes in and the bottom tray may not get filled |
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this makes the bottom tray riskier |
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and the top tray safer |
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to compensate for the higher risk |
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the bottom tray recives a higher rate of return |
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while the top recives a lower but stil nice return |
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to make the top even safer the banks will ensure it |
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for a small fee called a Credit Default Swap |
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the banks do all of this work so the credit rating agencies |
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will stamp the top slice as a safe, triple A rated investment |
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the highest safest rating there is |
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the okay slice is triple B - still pretty good |
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and they don't bother to rate the risky slice |
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because of the triple A rating |
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the investment banker can sell the safe slice |
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to the investors who only want safe investments |
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he sells the okay slice to other bankers |
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and the risky slices to hedge funds and other risk takers |
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the investment banker makes millions |
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he then repays his loans |
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finaly, the investors have found a good investment for their money |
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much better than the 1% tresaury bills |
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they are so pleased, they want more CDO slices |
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so the investment banker calls up the lender |
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wanting more morgages |
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the lender calls up the broker for more home owners |
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but the broker can't find anyone |
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everyone that qualifies for a morgage already has one |
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but they have an idea |
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when home owners default on their morgage |
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the lender gets the house |
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and houses are allways increasing in value |
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since they're covered if the home owners default |
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lenders can start adding risk to new morgages |
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not requiring down payments |
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no proof of income |
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no documents at all |
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and that's exactly what they did |
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so, instead of lending to responsible home owners |
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called Prime Morgages |
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they started to get some that were... well, less responsible |
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these are Sub-Prime Morgages |
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this is the turning point |

