Transcript for RSA Animate - Crises of Capitalism
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RSAnimate |
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www.theRSA.org |
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The Crises of Capitalism, 26 April 2010 |
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Is it time to look beyond Capitalism towards a new social order |
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that would allow us to live within a system |
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that could be responsible, just and humane? |
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. |
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Ok, so we've been through this crisis |
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and there are all sorts of explanatory formats out there. |
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And it's interesting to look at the different genres. |
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One genre is that, it's all about human frailty. |
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I mean, Alan Greenspan took refuge in the fact "it's human nature", |
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he said, "you can't do anything about that." |
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But there's a whole world of explanations |
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that kinda say it's the predatory instincts |
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It's the instinct for mastery. |
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The delusions of investors. |
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And the greed and all the rest of it. |
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So, there's a whole range of discussion of that. |
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And of course, the more we learn about the daily practices on Wall Street |
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we kind of figure there's a great deal of truth in all of that. |
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The second genre is that there's institutional failures. |
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That, you know, regulators were asleep at the switch. |
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The shadow banking system innovated outside of their purview. |
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Etc etc etc. |
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And, therefore, institutions have to be reconfigured. |
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And it has to be a global effort, by the G-20, something of that kind. |
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So, we look at the institutional level and say |
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that has failed and that has to be reconfigured. |
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The third genre is to say, everybody was obsessed with a false theory. |
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They read too much Hayek |
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and believed in the efficiency of markets. |
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And it's time we actually got back to something like Keynes. |
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Or we took seriously Hyman Minski's |
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theory about the inherent instability of financial activities. |
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The next genre is that it has cultural origins. |
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Now we don't hear that much in the United States |
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but if you were in Germany and France |
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there are many people there who would kind of say it's an Anglo-Saxon disease. |
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And, and it has nothing to do with us. |
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And I happened to be in Brazil when it was going on, and |
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Lula was kind of saying, well, first off he was saying |
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"Oh, thank God the United States is being disciplined by the equivalent of the IMF |
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We've been through it 8 times in the last 25 years |
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and now it's their turn. Fantastic!", said Lula, |
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and all the other Latin Americans I knew, until it hit them, which it does. |
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And then they kind of changed their tune a little bit. |
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So, there's a way of which it became cultural. |
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And, you can see that by the way in which this whole Greek thing is being handled. |
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The way the German press is saying, "Well, it's the Greek character |
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It's defects in the Greek character". |
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And there's a whole lot of rather nasty stuff going on around that. |
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But actually, there are some cultural features which have led into it. |
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For instance, the US fascination with |
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home ownership, |
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which is supposedly a deep cultural value. |
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So 67, 68% of US households are home owners. |
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It's only 22% in Switzerland. |
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Of course its a cultural value in the United States |
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that's being supported by the mortgage interest tax deduction, |
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which is a huge subsidy. |
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It's being promoted since the 1930s, very explicitly in the 1930s. |
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It was built up because the theory was |
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that debt incumbent home owners don't go on strike. |
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And then there's a kind of notion that it's a failure of policy |
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in that policy has actually intervened. |
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And there's a funny kind of alliance emerging between the Glenn Beck wing |
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for Fox News and the World Bank, |
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both of whom says the problem is too much regulation |
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of the wrong sort. |
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So there are all these ways, and all of them have a certain truth. |
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And skilled writers will take one or other of those perspectives and |
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build a story and actually write a very plausible kind of story about this. |
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And I thought to myself, |
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"Well, what kind of plausible story can I write, which is none of the above?" |
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Which is one of the things I always think to myself, and it's not hard to do |
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particularly when you're coming from a Marxist perspective because, you know |
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there aren't many people who try to do this analysis from a Marxist perspective. |
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And I was really clued into this by this thing that happened |
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at the London School of Economics about a year and a half ago when |
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Her Majesty, the Queen, asked the economists |
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"How come you guys didn't see this thing coming?" |
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She didn't say it exactly that way, but you know, it's the sentiment. |
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And, they got very upset. And she actually called the Governor of the Bank of England. |
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And said, "How come you didn't see it coming?" |
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And then the British Academy put forward this |
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got together all these economists and they came up with this fabulous letter |
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to Her Majesty. |
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And, it was actually astonishing. It said |
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"Well, you know, many dedicated people, intelligent, smart, spent their lives |
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working on aspects of this thing, very, very seriously |
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But the one thing we missed was systemic risk." |
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And you say, "What?!" |
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[Laughter] |
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And they went on to talk about the politics of denial and all the rest of it. |
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So I thought, well you know, systemic risk, you know |
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I can translate it into the Marxian thing. |
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You're talking about the internal contradictions of capital accumulation. |
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And maybe I should write a thing about the |
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internal contradictions of capital accumulation and |
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try to figure out the role of crisis in the whole history of Capitalism. |
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And what's specific and special about the crisis, this time around. |
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And there are two ways which I thought I would do that, |
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One was to look at what's happened since the 1970s to now. |
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And, the thesis there is that in many ways |
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the form of this current crisis is dictated very much |
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by the way we came out of the last one. |
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That the problem back in the 1970s was |
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excessive power of labour in relationship to capital. |
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That, therefore, the way out of the crisis last time |
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was to discipline labour. |
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And we know how that was done. |
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It was done by off-shoring. |
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It was done by, you know, Thatcher and Reagan. |
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And it was done by neo-liberal doctrine; |
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it was done in all kinds of different ways. |
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But by 1985 or 86, the labour question had essentially |
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been solved for capital. It had access to all the world's labour supplies. |
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Nobody in this particular instance, has cited |
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greedy unions as the root of the crisis. |
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Nobody, in this instance, is saying, |
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"It has something to do with the excessive power of labour." |
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If anything, it's the excessive power of capital. |
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And in particular, the excessive power of finance capital |
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which is the root of the problem. |
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Now, how did that happen? |
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Well, we've been, since the 1970s, in a phase, of what we call "wage repression". |
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That wages have remained stagnant |
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The share of wages in national income |
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right throughout the OECD countries has steadily fallen. |
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It's even steadily fallen in China, of all places. |
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So that, there's less and less being paid out in wages. |
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Well, wages turn out to be also the money |
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which buys goods. |
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So if you diminish wages, then |
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you got a problem with where's your demand going to come from. |
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And the answer was, "Well, get out your credit cards. |
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We'll give everybody credit cards." |
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So we'll overcome, if you like, the problem of effective demand |
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by actually pumping up the credit economy. |
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And American households and British households |
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all roughly tripled their debt over the last 20, 30 years. |
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And a vast amount of that debt, of course, has been within the housing market. |
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And out of this comes a theory which is very, very important |
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that Capitalism never solves its crisis problems. |
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It moves them around geographically. |
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And what we're seeing right now is a geographical movement of that. |
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Everybody says, "Well, okay, everything is |
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beginning to recover in the United States" |
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And then Greece goes bang, and everybody goes, |
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"What about the PIIGS?", you know. |
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And it's interesting, you had a finance crisis |
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in the financial system. |
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You sort of half-solve that |
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but at the expense of a sovereign debt crisis. |
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Actually, if you look at the accumulation process of capital |
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you see a number of limits and a number of barriers |
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and there's a wonderful language that Marx uses in the "Grundrisse". |
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where he talks about the way in which Capital cannot abide |
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a limit. |
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It has to turn it into a barrier |
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which it then circumvents or transcends. |
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And then when you look at the accumulation process |
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you look at where the barriers and limits might lie. |
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And the simple way to look at it is |
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to say, "Look, the typical circulation process |
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of accumulation goes like this. |
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You start with some money. |
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You go into the market and buy labour, power |
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and means of production. |
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Then you put them to work |
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with a given technology and organisational form |
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and you create a commodity. |
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Which you then sell for the original money plus a profit. |
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Now, you then take part of the profit |
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and you re-capitalise it into an expansion |
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for very interesting reasons. |
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Now, there are two things about this |
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One is that there're a number of barrier points in here. |
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How is the money got together |
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in the right place |
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at the right time |
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in the right volume? |
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And that takes financial ingenuity. |
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So the whole history of capitalism has been about financial innovation. |
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And financial innovation |
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has the effect of, also, empowering the financiers. |
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And the excessive power of the financiers, can sometimes... |
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They do get greedy, no question about it. |
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And if you look at financial profits in the United States |
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They were soaring after 1990; they were going up like this. |
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Profits in manufacturing were coming down like this. |
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And you can see the imbalance in this country |
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I think the way in which this country has sided with The City of London |
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against British manufacturing since the 1950s onwards |
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has had very serious implications for the economy of this country. |
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You've actually screwed Industry in order to keep, you know, financiers happy. |
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Any sensible person right now would join an anti-capitalist organisation. |
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And, you have to. |
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Because otherwise, we're going to have this continuation. |
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And notice it's a continuation of all sorts of negative aspects. |
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For instance, the racking up of wealth. |
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You would have thought the crisis would have stopped that. |
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Actually more billionaires emerged in India last year than ever. |
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They doubled last year. |
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The wealth of the rich in this country has accelerated. |
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Just last year, what happened was that leading hedge fund owners |
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got personal remunerations of $3 billion each, |
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in one year. |
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Now, I thought it was obscene and insane |
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a few years ago, when they got $250 million. |
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But they're now hauling in $3 billion. |
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Now that's not the world I want to live in, |
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and if you want to live in it, be my guest. |
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I don't see us debating and discussing this. |
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I don't have the solutions; I think I know what the nature of the problem is. |
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And unless we're prepared to have a very broad based discussion |
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that gets away from, you know, |
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the normal kind of pablum you get in a political campaign. |
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And you know, "Everything's going to be okay here next year if you vote for me". |
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Well, it's crap! |
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You should know it's crap. |
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And, say it is. |
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And we have a duty, it seems to me |
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those of us who are academics and seriously involved in the world |
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to actually change our mode of thinking. |
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Cognitive media |
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www.cognitivemedia.co.uk |